Restoring emotion\u27s bad rep: the moral randomness of norms by Ronald De Sousa
Despite the fact that common sense taxes emotions with irrationality, 
philosophers have, by and large, celebrat-
ed their functionality. They are credited 
with motivating, steadying, shaping or 
harmonizing our dispositions to act, and 
with policing norms of social behaviour. 
It's time to restore emotion's bad rep. To 
this end, I shall argue that we should ex-
pect that some of the “norms” enforced 
by emotions will be unevenly distributed 
among the members of our species, and 
may be dysfunctional at the individual, 
social, moral, or even species levels. I”ll 
adduce three considerations in support of 
that pessimistic view: the fallacy of adap-
tive fixation, the moral randomness of 
group selection, and the lack of fit between 
“natural norms” set up by evolution and 
those moral and social norms we would 
like philosophy to justify. 
First, talk of “fitness-enhancing” traits 
commonly assumes that if something 
is adaptive it will spread to fixation in a 
population. But fitness is often frequency 
dependent, implying that a stable out-
come of selection may be far from opti-
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mal from any normative point of view. The ratio of psychopaths in a population, or, for 
that matter, the ratio of males, may be cases in point.
Second, group selection is often credited with providing an explanation of the evo-
lution of altruism. But altruism, in the relevant sense, characterizes fanatical suicide 
bombers or slavish devotion to tyranny. More generally, evolution does nothing for the 
sake of individuals, except accidentally. 
That is part of a third, more general problem: the potential failure of natural “norms”, 
enforced by emotions and/or by mechanisms of social sanction to fit in with the values 
to which rational deliberation might lead. While natural selection undoubtedly works on 
several levels or “units”, individuals like you and me are not among its beneficiaries.
Here's my plan. I'll first briefly discuss what sorts of things norms might be, and what 
sort of enforcement of them one might have in mind entrusting to emotions. Specifi-
cally, I will contrast a narrow sense of prescriptive “norms” with a broader sense of the 
“normative” that embraces values, and sketch some ways in which emotions have or 
might be conceived to relate to both values and norms. Second, I”ll recapitulate the 
reasons for expecting fairly strong discrepancies between the objective biological func-
tions a psychological or behavioral trait might serve, and the considered values that 
human beings might hold dear at the individual, social, and cultural levels. Third, I'll 
briefly confront some methodological scruples about what has been pejoratively called 
the adaptationist-innatist point of view. Fourth, I'll recap some reasons for thinking 
Nature doesn't always work to optimize anything. Fifth, I'll sketch three illustrative ex-
amples spanning a very wide spectrum of “normative” standards for which an equally 
wide range of emotions serve to guide and motivate conduct. The examples will range 
from emotions linked to epistemic strategies to the place of psychopaths in our overall 
conception of the normal and the normative. In between those extremes, I will look at 
some more arcane discoveries about the relation between the subjective emotional char-
acter and the underlying biological functionality of certain forms of sexual behaviour.
1. Norms and normativity: what are we talking about?
There is much talk in cognitive science of “normativity”. Normativity is everywhere, 
frequently paired with the word “irreducible”, with the implication that where there is 
normativity, naturalism is doomed. Normativity belongs to the category of value rather 
than fact, of ought rather than is. A naturalist theory of anything is one that is supposed 
to rest entirely on facts, not values, that is to say on how things actually are as opposed 
to the way they ought to be, or are supposed to be. As I'll argue below, a biological sense 
of normativity can be fully naturalised, but this doesn't tell us anything much about 
values.
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One might question whether the terms “norm” and “normativity” don”t cover too di-
verse a range of things to be useful. In a forthcoming work, Ruwen Ogien and Chris-
tine Tappolet point out a number of differences between deontic norms and evaluative 
terms, and suggest that we should restrict the word “norm” to the former. Emotions 
relate to both; but perhaps they relate to them in different ways. Here are the more 
important contrasts drawn (Ogien and Tappolet forthcoming):
 A value is typically described in an indicative subject-predicate sentence; a norm, 
by an imperative or else one or a small set of a deontic expressions: “one must”, “one 
ought” “it is forbidden”, etc.
 Evaluative terms can be more or less “thick”, where that term implies some empiri-
cal content: “harmonious”, “depraved”, “hideous”, and “generous” are thick; “good” is 
thin. Deontic terms are intrinsically thin: to know that something must or must not be 
done is to know nothing about the properties of the “thing” in question.
 Only value terms admit of degrees. If I ought to do something, it’s not the case that 
I ought to do it to this or that degree. 
 Only value terms tend to have internal meaning relations to names of emotions 
(“disgusting”; “frightening”; “admirable”; “pitiful”). One can have a “feeling of obliga-
tion”, which can admit of degrees; but the feeling as such is not specific to any particular 
kind of obligation.
 Norms apply to a more restricted domain of things within an agent's power: as the 
slogan has it, “ought implies can”. Values extend to things that don't depend on some 
agent to whom the value applies. Thus a man might value beauty in himself or others 
but not have any means of procuring it. 
 The direction of fit of norms is world-to-mind, that of values, mind-to-world. This 
holds even for those inclined to be projectivists about value: whereas a norm posits how 
the world should be, the attribution of a value to an object in the world amounts to a 
claim that the object really has that value. 
	Values can be brought in to justify norms, but not vice versa (Mulligan 1998). Thus 
it makes sense to say: “Justice requires that the defendant be acquitted”, but not vice 
versa.
These differences mark off the domain of deontology from axiology. The domain of De-
ontology is concerned only with acting, or refraining. Insofar as emotions are required 
only to motivate action, then, we can think of them as just pushing and pulling: swayed 
by the totality of your emotions and desires at any particular time, either you act or you 
don’t. The pronouncements of deontology are essentially limited to what is forbidden, 
what is permitted, and what is required. In the sequel, when I refer to norms, I will 
mean to designate only strict deontological norms, as distinct from values. 
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Now if emotions are held to enforce norms, are we speaking of “norms” in the strict 
sense, or of the broader sense of the normative that includes values? Should we expect 
a distinction between emotions relevant to deontology and those that relate to values? 
It would seem that the appropriate emotions to enforce deontic norms will be those 
that pertain to what one ought to do, or should have done, or else ought or should 
not have done. That list is short. It’s pretty much limited to guilt, regret, and maybe 
some emotion that we might refer to as the “sense of duty”. Call this restricted set the 
“deontic emotions”. Shame is sometimes included in the list, but it doesn't fit properly 
because shame is not limited in its objects to acts that lie in an agent's power. The broad 
spectrum of possible emotions, by contrast, confronts us with the complexities of the 
axiological domain, which varies only in terms of degrees, but also in terms of the 
dimensions in which those degrees might be measured. This contrast gives rise to the 
problem of “mixed emotions”, and especially those mixed emotions that are responses 
to moral dilemmas. For deontological ethics, moral dilemmas are paradoxical: for it 
would seem that I ought to do x and I ought to refrain from x are contraries. From multi-
dimensional axiological perspective, by contrast, mixed emotions aroused by a moral 
dilemma merely indicate the presence of incommensurable values (greenspan 1978; 
greenspan 1995).
Emotions admit of degrees, and their frequent link to evaluative terms suggests that 
they are closer kin to evaluations than to norms. But that doesn't show that they don't 
serve to enforce deontic norms. For though the norm may not admit of degrees, the in-
fluence of emotions on compliance (or rejection) of that norm could do so, in two ways. 
First, two norms could differ in importance. (Ogien gives the example of “don’t talk 
with your mouth full” vs. “don’t erase the hard disk in your mother’s computer”.) Per-
tinent emotional responses to the infraction of one or the other of these two prescrip-
tions might well differ in intensity. Furthermore, prescriptive norms might be ordered, 
so that in case of practical conflict—when only lying could save a life, for example—the 
prescription Act in such a way as to save a life would trump Don’t lie. And the emo-
tional reluctance to lie may well be less intense than the emotional reluctance to allow 
someone to be killed. Secondly, that very ordering may itself be justified by the differ-
ent values placed on truth telling and on life. If, as Mulligan (1998) noted, values justify 
norms, the degree of importance attributed to the value may seem to contaminate the 
prescriptive rule itself. But that, Ogien and Tappolet argue, may be an illusion. They 
adduce this example: suppose I owe $10000 in taxes and you owe $9000. If we both fail 
to pay, the punishment exacted by a criminal court for fraud could be proportioned to 
the value of the unpaid tax. So the gravity of the sanctions could be a matter of degree. 
A further question again (cf. Miller 2005) is whether the emotion of guilt you and I ex-
perience observes, or should observe, the same proportionality. But although you owe 
less than I do, you are not less obligated to pay.
In sum, then, there are three factors that could explain the temptation to find differ-
ences of degree among deontic norms: (1) gradations in the values that underlie and 
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justify the norms; (2) a ranking in importance of different norms; and (3) degrees of 
gravity in the sanctions prescribed for infraction of the norms. None of these amounts 
to a reason to attribute degrees to prescriptive norms in themselves. 
Even if this is right, however, there are other variable aspects of norms that don't set-
tle neatly into this dichotomy. At a very early age, children make a clear distinction 
between conventional and harm-based norms. From the first, but not the second, a 
change in the dictates of authority suffices to relieve us (Turiel 1983); (Nichols 2004). 
One might expect the emotional discomfort involved in infringing the latter to be more 
powerful than is involved in the infraction of merely conventional norms. But that’s an 
empirical question. And actually it seems the emotional barriers against transgressing 
purely social norms are extremely powerful. The evidence is in Stanley Milgram’s fa-
mous “subway experiment”, in which he got graduate students to go up to people in an 
uncrowded subway and ask them to yield their seat.1 The most striking observation that 
emerged from this was not so much the fact that nearly 70% of those asked willingly 
gave up their seat, but how extraordinarily difficult it was to ask. Yet it’s worth remark-
ing that whatever norm the experimenters were violating in the subway was one that is 
never taught, discussed, justified, or even made explicit. I’ll return, towards the end of 
this paper, to cases of norms—if they can still be called that—that are completely hid-
den from normal awareness.
Another type of case that’s hard to classify is the norm of fairness. Is it a value or a 
norm? A situation can be more or less fair. As a value, then, fairness seems to admit of 
degrees. In the ultimatum game in which one of two subjects gets to make a take-it-or 
leave-it offer to the other, the subject receiving the offer has an economic interest in ac-
cepting any sum greater than zero. It has been shown, however, that subjects are willing 
to give up surprisingly large sums of free money for the sake of punishing a radically 
unfair offer (Oosterbeek, Sloof and van de kuilen 2004). But the actual response in the 
ultimatum game has to be Yes or No, so while there can be a gradual increase in the 
force of indignation, there is just a threshold where it snaps, and there the agent may 
simply say: “This offer must be rejected.” 
What then exactly is the relation of the emotion to the norm, and what is its relation to 
the value? If emotions justify judgments of values and values, in turn, can justify deon-
tic norms, then emotions are twice removed from norms in terms of justification. So on 
the standard assumption that emotions can directly motivate behaviour, it is interesting 
to note—though I don't quite know what to make of it—that they can justify that same 
behaviour only indirectly. 
Not every emotion justifies a value, nor does every value dictate some deontic norm. 
Many philosophers, however, have identified some emotions as specifically “moral” 
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ones. The sentiments of benevolence and compassion, dear to Hutcheson and Hume, 
march pleasantly in step with social virtues. One could cite similar thoughts from such 
widely different sages as Mencius and Aristotle. For the moment, however, I will sim-
ply ignore the delicate question of what emotions justify what values and when. I shall 
proceed on the assumption that there is no general and systematic formula for relating 
the justification of values to the functionality of emotions. This is not a merely evasive 
move, so much as a principled one. In the next section, I shall attempt to explain why.
2. “True” values and “objective” teleology
When Aristotle asked what this or that characteristic or disposition was for, he felt con-
fident that an answer could be forthcoming in terms of the intrinsic good that would 
come of that characteristic for the kind of thing in question. And he was confident 
that one could discover how things were supposed to be in nature by observing what 
happened “always or for the most part” (Aristotle, Met. 6-vi). In the practice of biologi-
cal sciences, this method is still of practical use. Studying the details of what actually 
takes place is essential to the discovery of functions. We must assume that things do in 
fact happen “normally” much of the time. In addition, we can sometimes observe the 
causal role played by some specific mechanism or component of a biological system 
in the accomplishment of the system's manifest role (Cummins 1975; Amundson and 
Lauder 1994). But the philosophical ground on which this method rests has crumbled 
with the discovery of evolution.2 If species have arisen from a long dynamic process 
that has led from unicellular organisms to the elaborate forms of life familiar to us now, 
we are forced to infer that what usually happens is not a reliable guide to what is sup-
posed to happen. Human beings are the outcome of a huge series of experiments, most 
of which were subjected to merciless destruction. At every stage of natural selection 
which brought our ancestors closer to Homo Sapiens, those of our ancestors who bore 
the innovative genome were what Aristotle would have regarded as freaks of nature. 
Nevertheless, modern philosophy of biology has elaborated an essentially satisfactory 
substitute for the notion of inherent teleology. This is the dominant, if not quite un-
disputed, account of teleology provided by the aetiological theory of objective proper 
function. The basic idea is that the attribution of a function to certain effects rather 
than others can be justified without reference to any external goal or design. At most, 
one needs only the entirely general and quasi-tautological premise that the “goal” of 
life is to perpetuate itself. The aetiological conception of teleology makes use of the 
common-sense idea that functions, and teleological properties more generally, explain 
2 Admittedly this fact continues to be stubbornly denied in certain circles. The Aristotelian conception is still 
current in the Vatican, and with all those who oppose genetically modified products or artificial reproductive 
technology on the ground that these are “against nature”. All these modern Aristotelians are one in spirit with the 
airline passenger in an old gardner Rea cartoon who remonstrates with the flight attendant: “No thank you, I don't 
think Nature intended us to drink while flying”.
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the presence of the organ or phenomenon to which they are ascribed. They explain it 
not in terms of their efficient cause, but in terms of their effects. That conception also 
transposes into a different mode Aristotle's idea that certain non-existent effects (those 
he called potentialities) are privileged over others in that they only are supposed to take 
place, whether they end up doing so or not. 
The most sophisticated elaboration of the aetiological theory of function is due to Ruth 
Millikan (1984; 1993). The following formula is a somewhat simplified version:
 (P) An element X has the proper function F if and only if:
1.  X results from the reproduction of an antecedent element Y; 
2.  Y effected F in the past, in virtue of properties (i....n) reproduced in X 
3.  X exists because Y effected F.
This formula accounts for the main intuitions behind the common notion of function, 
as used in biology: in particular, it allows us to understand the presence of an organ in 
terms of what it does, and to make the distinction between functioning and malfunc-
tioning, as well as that between functions and accidental effects. It defines a concept 
of objective teleology. Whether or not something is a function may be very difficult or 
even impossible to discern in a particular case. The formula does not claim to supply an 
invariably useful criterion, but to specify the meaning of the claim of functionality. 
What the aetiological conception of function does not do, on the other hand, is give us 
any reason whatever to think, as Aristotle did, that an effect is good because it's a natu-
ral actualization of a potentiality. If my “actualization” serves the purposes of alien rep-
licators, it may or may not be conducive to values I hold dear. In the currency of repli-
cation, they alone are the ultimate beneficiaries of evolution. Each organism breaks the 
mould. My phenotype has never existed before. genes, by contrast, like single-celled 
organisms, are effectively immortal. To be sure, their identity across time is not strictly 
maintained, since the very possibility of evolution rests on copying errors; but neither 
could evolution have taken place unless these errors were extremely rare. What is more, 
individual DNA molecules pass away like all material things. What subsists—as in the 
promise of Shakespeare's Sonnet LXV, that in black ink my love may still shine bright—is 
the information transmitted in the lineage of sexual cells from generation to genera-
tion: “The gene is not the DNA molecule; it is the transmissible information coded in 
the DNA” (Williams 1992, 11). So we could say that bodies fulfill their proper function 
in fostering the survival of genes. To put it more provocatively, organism are organs of 
their genes. Since individuals belonging to sexually reproducing species are never re-
produced, the converse does not hold. Admittedly, the process we call “reproduction” 
suffices to maintain certain characteristics without which organisms would lack the 
fitness that enables them to transmit their genes. But organisms like ourselves are not 
capable of the sort of faithful reproduction that allows their copies to be reidentifiable 
across the ages.
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3. Methodological scruples 
I'm aware that thinking in terms of an evolutionary framework of this sort seems crazy 
to some people. It raises two red flags: adaptationism, and nativism. In an attack on Ste-
ven Pinker, Jerry Fodor (1999) urges that it's all right to be “nativists”, but that we must 
reject adaptationism. His argument is a rhetorical question: “Does wanting to have a 
beautiful woman—or, for that matter, a good read—really require a further motive to 
explain it?” We don't need any explanation for, say, our innate propensity to love our 
children. 
But we do. Titania, when she finds herself loving Bottom in the form of an ass, does not 
ask herself why. But we do; and actually her love at first sight is very much like every 
mother's. A spell had been cast: 
What thou seest when thou dost wake,
Do it for thy true-love take,
Love and languish for his sake:
Be it ounce, or cat, or bear,
Pard, or boar with bristled hair,
In thy eye that shall appear
When thou wakest, it is thy dear.
This fits the case of love of children rather well. Like Titania, a new mother's behav-
iour is controlled by being placed under the tutelage of an emotion. The origin of that 
emotion is chemical and mechanical, but the “love” it generates is perceived as wholly 
unlike anything chemical or mechanical. By its means, the will of another agent—in 
one case Oberon, in the case of mammalian mothers, the genes—passes into, or is ex-
pressed by, the “will” of the individual. Finally, while it does not necessarily have bad 
consequences, it allows them, as Oberon's wish manifests in the very next line:
Wake when some vile thing is near.
Rejecting the demand for an explanation of the emotions we feel, and of the behaviour 
these trigger, on the basis of our failure to experience the motivation to propagate our 
genes, is no more sensible than claiming that since I'm not conscious of the tensing of 
my tendons when I just flex my finger, my capacity to do so requires no physiological 
explanation.
Although our emotional repertoire arises from the complex particulars of our expe-
riences in infancy and beyond, those experiences would be meaningless and would 
form no emotional dispositions at all if what happens in our childhood did not arouse 
certain innate responses. In practical deliberation, the most obvious stopping points in 
a chain of justification refer to desires, typically linked to emotional responses. In turn, 
those desires and emotions have their roots in capacities for unconditioned response 
that can plausibly be supposed to be heritable, and subject to genetic variance. But what 
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is striking about those sorts of ultimate argument stoppers in emotional justification, is 
that while—at least in some cases—they make perfectly good sense as adaptations from 
the biological point of view, they are in no way acknowledged as such. Their biological 
function is completely divorced from their phenomenology. genes (in the broad sense) 
have influenced our basic emotional dispositions—by which I do not mean stereotyped 
responses to specific stimuli, but the biasing of learning in certain ways that result in 
an increased propensity to go in for certain sorts of behaviour. But the “goals” of those 
genes don't coincide with the conscious aims or desires of the individual organism that 
pursues those goals. It is as if our genes, the more securely to secure our devotion to 
the tasks for which they have “designed” us, are better off concealing from their agents 
themselves the true purposes of the missions for which they were recruited. And that, 
of course, means that there is likely to be a screening off of the teleology of the behav-
iour from the conscious motivation. So if that is Adaptationism, it is significantly modi-
fied by the fact that it makes no inference about the desirability of the traits that result 
from the supposed “adaptation”. 
I will persist, then, in pursuing the hypothesis that our emotions sometimes enforce 
“norms” that do not necessarily correspond to what we consciously espouse. Further-
more, in the way that emotions evolved, we can see several good reasons for being 
ambivalent about their “functions”.
4. The ambivalence of emotional functions
On standard conceptions of their functions, the emotions effect appraisals of impor-
tant aspects of agents' life-affecting situations, and prepare the body physiologically for 
some appropriate response.3 While all or most emotions are generally acknowledged 
to be intentional states, the fact that they are grounded in more extensive physiological 
processes than other mental states is crucial to their capacity to afford “action readi-
ness” (Frijda 1986). This utilitarian view of emotions was already quite pithily expressed 
by Descartes, who wrote that 
the utility of all the passions consists only in their strengthening thoughts 
which it is good [the soul] preserve and which could otherwise easily be 
effaced from it, and causing them to endure in the soul. (Passions of the Soul 
§74)
—and pointed out, in the next sentence, why that virtue of emotions also explains the 
trouble they get us into: 
3 Some of the relevant situations are concerned with at least three of the traditional “four F’s”: (Fnourishment, 
Fescape, Fcombat, and Freproduction), though the states most directly concerned with the first, namely hunger 
and disgust, are often deemed too simple to count as emotions. 
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So too, – he continued – all the evil they can cause consists either in their 
strengthening and preserving those thoughts more than necessary or in their 
strengthening and preserving others it is not good to dwell on.
This is just one of the ways in which the assessment of emotions by moralists has tended 
to be ambivalent. To each silver lining, its cloud. I'll look at some specific examples later. 
But first I want to stress three general grounds for questioning the extent to which our 
native emotional dispositions should be expected to be beneficial to ourselves.
Here is the general point that arises out of the fact that our natures have been condi-
tioned by evolution: there is only a largely adventitious correlation between what is bio-
logically functional in the objective sense and what is of value to me as an individual, 
living in a certain social context at a certain place and time. While masters have an in-
terest in the life of their slaves, that interest extends only so far as they need to live to do 
their job. That interest does not extend to the welfare, happiness, or subjective interests 
of the slaves themselves. Similarly, evolution didn't happen to benefit any individual, 
except accidentally. 
(i) Why McDonald's is god's own food
It is a remarkable fact that only at McDonald's restaurant can you take any small child, 
raised in any culinary culture, and be certain of the child's approval. Clearly, McDon-
ald cheeseburgers and fries are what god meant us to eat. That's because when natural 
selection, or, as it is known in some circles, the Intelligent Designer, was doing its work, 
just such a combination of fat, protein, salt and sugar as McDonald concocts was the 
most likely to secure survival. 
I noted that certain emotions have earned the title of social or moral emotions. In 
terms of the contrast between norms and values, one might surmise that empathy and 
compassion are best thought of as axiological, while guilt is more plausibly described 
as an enforcer of deontology. It is worth remembering, however, that the emotional 
consequence of transgression is not always negative. Transgression of a prohibition can 
be more of a thrill than failure to act on a value. Do those who get a thrill out of doing 
something forbidden get only milder pleasure from doing something they consider 
merely worthless or even bad, but not actually forbidden? I don't know of research on 
this, but it's a promising thesis topic for a behavioural psychologist. It might explain 
why the consumption of alcohol actually rose during prohibition above the level at-
tained just before (Warburton 1932, pp. 23–26, 72). It might also suggest cheaper and 
more rational alternatives to the current War on Drug Users. 
In any case, the standard story obviously has plenty of room for analogues of cravings 
for McDonald's. Murderous male aggression is one example. Martin Daly and Margot 
Wilson (1988) have shown that while the rates of homicide vary by a whole order of 
magnitude across the planet, the proportion of homicides that are committed by males 
everywhere, in the most peaceful as in the most violent societies, doesn't stray beyond 
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two or three percentage point of 95%. It's hard to deny that this must result from the 
genetic success of that particular strategy for getting one's way. So while one standardly 
thinks of emotions of guilt, shame and compassion as liable to enforce the norm against 
killing, there's another way to think about it. From the strictly biological point of view, 
murderous rage enforces a kind of norm of its own. Though neither a social norm nor 
a consciously endorsed one, it's a kind of biological norm of its own. Lust for rape, 
xenophobia, religious zeal, and perhaps even homophobia4 may be other examples of 
emotional reactions that might have roots in a fitness enhancing strategy, giving them 
an objective functionality that has become out of step with values endorsed by civilized 
21 century people. 
(ii) Frequency-dependent fitness
Both adaptationists and anti-adaptationists tend to assume that if a characteristic is 
under genetic control, it will either prove beneficial or harmful and tend, respectively, 
either to fixation or to extinction. But this is an important mistake. The success of any-
thing you do depends largely on how many others do it too. Or putting it into jargon, 
the fitness of many strategies is frequency-dependent. What we should expect, then, is 
not elimination from or fixation into a species' nature, in such a way that exceptions can 
simply be dismissed as malfunctions resulting from a deleterious mutation, but poly-
morphism. As was first vividly illustrated by Maynard-Smith's example about hawks 
and doves, what we should expect in many cases is that whether there is a pair of alter-
native strategies, each will be advantageous only providing it isn't too widespread. Thus 
the genes of a female have an advantage if most members of the population are male, 
because they get to spread more widely than those of the males in the next generation. 
But the same is true of males. Regardless of the obvious wastefulness of dragging along 
so many useless males, therefore, the two sexes will reach an equilibrium of around 
51%M to 49%F at the time of conception, which makes (given that males are the more 
fragile sex) for equality at peak reproductive age (Fisher 1930). This is an Evolutionarily 
Stable Strategy (ESS) (Maynard-Smith 1984; Dawkins 1976). Maynard-Smith originally 
defines an ESS as a mixed strategy that can't be invaded. Strictly speaking, what counts 
in measuring the crucial ratio is the number of acts conforming to one or the other 
strategies. They can be distributed among agents in any way that preserves that ratio. 
In the case of sex, each organism generally chooses a fixed strategy. But in the case of 
hawks and doves, it is compatible with every individual acting always in the same way, 
either as a hawk or as a dove; or with all individuals adopting a mixed strategy in the 
ratio specified by the ESS; or any combination of strategies in between. 
4 The reasoning here rests on a (potentially controversial) finding that most homosexual acts involve bisexual 
persons, and that bisexual individuals (human as well as of some other species) have a higher net reproductive rate 
than exclusively heterosexual ones (Baker and Bellis 1995, 116ff.). Paradoxically, then, homosexual men would be 
seen by heterosexual men as particularly dangerous rivals for reproductive success.
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In sum, there is a virtually infinite number of combinations of possible strategies that 
might implement a given ESS. It would be interesting to explore how a particular im-
plementation of a given ESS is actually arrived at in any concrete case. Another promis-
ing thesis topic. And in the case that particularly interests social science—the mix of 
strategies of cooperation, defection, and punishment—the range of possibilities is even 
greater. 
It is widely recognized that kin selection and reciprocal altruism do not suffice to ex-
plain altruistic acts between strangers in large groups. Here again, the advantages of 
cooperation and defection depend in part on what others are doing. Peter Danielson 
has noted that although many of the classical discussions vaunt some specific strategy 
(such as TFT), we should expect populations to be mixed, consisting of unconditional 
cooperators, free riders, and different kinds of reciprocators (Danielson 2002). 
Robert Boyd and Peter Richerson have explored, in a number of studies, the possible 
role of punishment in securing cooperation (Boyd and Richerson 1992; Boyd, Richer-
son, gintis, et al. 2003). But punishment is itself costly, and so punishers must them-
selves display altruism and are subject to temptation to second order defection. There 
are therefore a number of possible strategies, including pure cooperation without pun-
ishment; cooperation at the first degree and also in punishment; “moralistic” punish-
ment of non-punishers, and even punishment without cooperation. These give rise to a 
number of different possible ESS's. In work based on Boyd and Richerson's, computer 
simulations by Ernst Fehr and Urs Fischbacher (2003) suggest that only second order 
punishment (punishment of non-punishers) succeeds in securing cooperation in large 
numbers.
But that only pushes back the problem, for what, in turn, secures the motivation for 
punishment at the second level? At this stage, it is appealing to resort to some sort of 
group selection, favouring a propensity to experience a primitive moralistic emotion. 
But as noted in the very title of Boyd and Richerson's 1992 paper, punishment allows 
the evolution of cooperation or anything else. Moralistic emotions may succeed in pro-
moting the replication of genes in a certain sort of group, but there is no reason to think 
that this must be, from the point of view of any individual members of such groups, a 
good Thing.
5. Illustrative cases 
(i) Epistemic norms and epistemic emotions
My first illustration is deliberately chosen to be as far removed as possible from the sort 
of norms that tend to arouse passionate intensity. It concerns the choice of epistemic 
strategies. 
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 In a recent issue of Nature, Jonathan Cohen and gary Aston-Jones (2005) look at some 
findings by Angela Yu and Peter Dayan (2005) on the application to science of the 
trade-off between exploration and exploitation. Exploitation of known resources is safe 
but likely to yield diminishing returns. On the other hand, giving up well-trodden paths 
for the sake of exploration may yield a jackpot of discovery, but is inherently risky. 
That trade-off is well known to students of foraging. An ant faced with an established 
path may either follow it, in the expectation of finding food where many others have 
already found it, or else strike out in an unexplored direction. The latter option is risky 
but will pay off, if not for the individual at least for the colony, when the original sourc-
es of food are exhausted (Johnson 2003). This is a good example, then, of a mechanism 
first instantiated at the most basic level of foraging decisions. What is surprising is that 
it can be directly applied in the context of sophisticated scientific cognitive strategies, 
where it appears still to be controlled by a combination of chemical triggers. 
Subjectively, the tension between the relative security of “normal science” and the ex-
citement of a potentially fruitful paradigm shift is experienced as a struggle between 
cognitive fear and cognitive greed. The balance between the tendency to explore and 
the tendency to exploit in the cognitive domain are apparently regulated in part by 
specific neuromodulators, associated with two distinct issues of uncertainty. The first 
concerns the bearing of a signal, the second, the signal's reliability: 
Acetylcholine signals expected uncertainty, coming from known unreliability 
of predictive cues within a context. Norepinephrine signals unexpected 
uncertainty, as when unsignaled switches produce strongly unexpected 
observations. These uncertainty signals interact to enable optimal inference 
and learning in noisy and changeable environments. This formulation is 
consistent with a wealth of physiological, pharmacological, and behavioral 
data implicating acetylcholine and norepinephrine in specific aspects of a 
range of cognitive processes. (Yu and Dayan 2005, p. 681)
Yu and Dayan go on to remark that there seem to be “a class of attentional cueing tasks 
that involve both neuromodulators and shows how their interactions may be part-an-
tagonistic, part-synergistic” (Yu and Dayan 2005). And of course those sorts of situa-
tions are typically experienced, in humans, as giving rise to emotional states: the “fear” 
in the risk of being wrong; the “lure” of the unknown; the “disappointment” generated 
by scientific prospects that don't pan out. What Yu and Dayan's discovery seems to be 
telling us is that a chemical mechanism underlies, in part, both the phenomenology 
of emotion and the process of what we assume to be high-level decision-making. This 
raises an intriguing question: can we think of the emotions more or less consciously felt 
in these epistemic dilemmas as policing the epistemic strategies of scientific exploration 
and invention? If so, with people as with ants, there may be one or more ESS's, which 
are not necessarily optimal from anyone's point of view. Under what conditions would 
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we have reason to believe that the balance between the two strategies, either in the 
mind of an individual person or a population of ordinary people, is the optimal bal-
ance? Again, I don't know: there's yet another promising thesis topic. 
Boyd and Richerson (2005) have looked at a related problem: the equilibria relating 
to the tendency to act on the basis of what one has learned from the available cues, as 
against the tendency to imitate others. The equilibria achieved, and whether they are 
beneficial or maladaptive, depends on a number of factors. In a stable environment, if 
enough people have adjusted their behaviour to the objective cues available, it will pay 
for most members of the community to imitate rather than attempt to interpret the 
cues or devise procedures on their own. The advantages of one or the other strategy are 
also frequency-dependent. As in the ant foraging case, they depend for each on what 
others are doing. If nearly everyone else is just copying the majority, then it might pay 
me to be somewhat more discriminating. But in some circumstances, if I imitate more 
often than the majority, then I will require a higher threshold of difference before I risk 
diverging from the common behaviour. And that may make me less likely to make a 
learning error (Boyd and Richerson p. 87). On the other hand, the risk involved in too 
much imitation is that the originator of the behaviour one is imitating may have made 
a mistake. 
(ii) Unconscious emotional drives
In our Western society, monogamy passes for an accepted social norm. Yet there is fas-
cinating data presented by Robin Baker and Mark Bellis, suggesting that a surprising 
amount of sexual behaviour is influenced by a complicated teleology of “sperm wars”. 
Some of this, they hypothesize, may be due to the advantage some females may derive 
in distinguishing one set of characteristics in the male from whom they solicit a genetic 
contribution, from another incompatible set in the partner that want for cooperative 
child raising: 
a female, by soliciting copulation with her partner at infertile stages of her 
cycle but with the most favoured male at the most fertile stages, could contrive 
to retain her partner's services as a parent while having offspring with the 
more favoured male. (Baker and Bellis 1995, p. 151)
In support of this hypothesis, there is evidence that 
females not taking oral contraceptives copulate more with their partners 
(IPC's, [intra-pair copulation]) during the infertile luteal phase but more with 
extra-pair males during the fertile pre-ovulatory phrase. There is a significant 
positive association between EPC incidence and probability of conception 
(P=0.018). (Baker & Bellis 1995, p. 161)
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That makes it less surprising, then, that blood group studies and more recently DNA 
studies world-wide place the reported incidence of paternal discrepancy as high as 10% 
to 15% (Baker 2006, p. 64; Baker and Bellis 1995, p. 200). What particularly interests 
me here, however, is how to explain the emotions involved in bringing about these 
consequences. Where emotions influence a type of behaviour one can, of course, take 
the Fodor line: obviously (EPC) is more exciting and spontaneous, so you forget about 
birth control. Who needs more? If there is an obvious folk-psychological explanation 
for the fact, there is nothing more to be asked. 
But that seems to me absurd. The fact that an emotion provides an intuitive sense of 
understanding doesn't dispense us from wanting an explanation of the emotion itself. 
Why is it that (EPC's) have the greater emotional urgency? Again, it seems reasonable 
to suppose that there is a kind of objective biological “normative” value here, wholly 
disjoint, of course, in our culture, from the “social norm” that enjoins monoandry, and 
that the intensity of sexual emotion involved represent the enforcement of that discrep-
ant value. 
(iii) Psychopathy: the other side of an ESS?
My final illustration concerns psychopaths. My suggestion here is simple. In view of 
recent work on psychopaths, one can make a much sharper distinction between what 
I shall call true psychopaths and others manifesting a pattern sometimes labeled Anti-
Social Personality Disorder (ASPD, sometimes also referred to as “sociopathy”). 
Blair et al. (2005) propose a three-factor model, comprising antisocial behavior, narcis-
sism, and an emotional factor. A high score on this last is what sets true psychopaths 
apart. Anti-social behaviour in non-psychopaths tends to trigger high levels of anxiety; 
but in psychopaths, anxiety levels are lower. They fail to manifest the sweating reflexes 
generally elicited from subjects who are about to undergo an unpleasant experience 
such as an electric shock. In a game of cards in which it becomes clear to subjects that 
an initially winning strategy actually leads to consistent loss, they show no tendency 
to reverse their chosen strategy. These peculiarities form a cluster, a “callous-unemo-
tional” pattern, which can be identified in children as young as seven (Blair 2005, pp. 
113-115, 122).
At the neurological level, the crucial factor seems to be traceable to the baso-lateral 
nuclei of the amygdala (BLA). The amygdala is involved in three distinct patterns of 
learning. Psychopathy does not affect the association of unconditioned response to 
conditioned stimulus (UR-CS). So psychopaths are perfectly able to learn in the usual 
cognitive sense. By contrast, the BLA is crucial to associations of conditioned stimuli 
both with affect representations (fear) and with valenced sensory properties (such as im-
ages or perceptions of suffering). Psychopaths are simply unaffected not just by the 
suffering of others, but also by the prospect of their own. As a result, they are incapable 
of passive avoidance learning. 
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There is independent reason to think that genetic factors play an important part in psy-
chopathy. Blair et al. (2005, p. 30) cite evidence from Viding, Blair, Moffitt et al. 2005, 
for high heritability of the callous-unemotional factor that differentiates psychopathy 
from ASPD.
Now if psychopathy is indeed heritable, why should we not regard it as an alternative 
strategy? Once again, like the distribution of the sexes, we might just be dealing with a 
natural norm, which is simply not one that is beneficial to the sort of people we like to 
think we are, or the kind of societies we'd like to live in. Psychopathy may be just one 
facet of an ESS.5 
6. Conclusion
There is much work to do to figure out just what norms are, and how they relate to the 
broader concept of normativity. But what the preceding considerations suggest is that 
some norms appear to be entirely hidden or unconscious, and they come to light only 
through the emotions that promote, impede, or enforce them. This is the case for the 
Milgram inhibitions, and also in the sexual examples from Baker and Bellis. 
As for psychopathy, it illustrates the three other central themes I have stressed, all of 
which, I have suggested, follow from taking seriously the perspective of natural selec-
tion. 
First, while it is possible to make sense, on the basis of the aetiological model, of the 
notion of an objective natural function, we cannot assume that anything represents an 
5 In the absence of any direct measure, we could approach the question of whether psychopathy is heritable on 
the basis of the following fact. James Blair cites an intriguing statistic from a study of prison inmates in various 
countries, reporting a higher mean incidence of ASPD (50-80%) for male inmates, as opposed to 47% world-wide 
(Blair, Mitchell and Blair 2005, p. 19). They further note that only 25% of ASPD affected males in the US meet the 
more stringent criteria for psychopathy. In all, then, one can calculate that about 13%-20% of US prison inmates 
are psychopathic. 
Now it's also a fact that the Land of the Free imprisons about 5 times as many people per thousand as the world 
average (6 times as many as China, that bastion of human rights, and 7 times as the EU). But, as we have seen, 
the proportion of ASPD affected inmates in the world as a whole is lower. So there are two possibilities about the 
proportion of psychopaths in the world population as a whole. If the proportion of psychopathy to ASPD in other 
countries is the same as in the US, we would have to conclude that the US somehow produces at least five times 
as many psychopaths as the rest of the world. given that the US is ethnically diverse, that would suggest that this 
is an effect of culture, not of genetics. The alternative hypothesis is that psychopathy is indeed an innate strategy, 
which over time in the EEA has settled into something like an ESS. If that is the case, though, the proportion of 
psychopaths in the population as a whole should be the same in the rest of the world as in the US. And this would 
be confirmed, if one could establish that in the prison population world-wide (and particularly in Europe) true 
psychopaths were found five to eight times more often than in the US. But since we know that fewer than half of 
male inmates in Europe show ASPD, this would mean that virtually all of them would have to be psychopaths. In 
Europe, then, the ASPD affected inmates would all be psychopaths, whereas in the US the 75% of ASPD affected 
inmates who are not psychopaths would have been, somehow, manufactured by their environment. This is awk-
ward for the genetic theory of psychopathy, but would cohere with the suggestion that there exist necessary genetic 
preconditions that require, for the production of the full-fledged psychopathic strategy, specific environmental 
conditions.
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advantage, or is fitness-enhancing, in such a way that natural selection will gradually 
foster it to fixation in a population. Behaviour is only useful or deleterious in the con-
text of what others do. 
Second, even in the context of a strategy that can contribute to an ESS, a trait selected 
for the sake of such a strategy is not necessarily beneficial to its individual bearer. This 
holds regardless of the extent to which the trait has been elaborated at a great distance 
from what is genetically or otherwise inherited, by processes of cultural evolution. For 
cultures are, to put it bluntly, just as much liable to be irredeemably nasty as is nature. 
Submission to savage tyranny, or to bloodthirsty rituals demanded by cruel deities, is 
also a kind of altruism, and has all too frequently proved to be the outcome of the com-
bined wisdom of nature and nurture. 
Thirdly, while I have argued that the aetiological concept of function allows us to make 
perfectly good sense of what Nature intends, in an objective sense (though often, of 
course, epistemically inaccessible), we should be, on the whole, concerned with what 
Nature intends only in the sense that it is always a good idea to spy on your friends as 
carefully as on your foes. What we want, and value, and intend, collectively and indi-
vidually, though ultimately causally traceable to the machinations of nature, is now 
largely unrelated to it. That something functions as nature intended does not show that 
we should value it. We are, as they say, children of nature, or products of nature. But we 
are also the grand-children of unicellular organisms. By now, nothing on Mars could be 
more alien from us than those ancestors, or than the beneficiaries of that long process 
by which we have become human, over three and a half billion years, one monstrous 
freak at a time.
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